What is the Impact of the Iran War on Domestic Terror Threats in the UK?

Leane Sokhn • May 12, 2026

What is the Impact of the Iran War on Domestic Terror Threats in the UK?

The Iran war, which started on 28th February 2026, has materially elevated the risk of domestic terrorism in the United Kingdom (UK). Over 20 Iranian plots have been uncovered in the UK in the past 12 months, the UK terror threat level was placed under immediate review following the initial strikes, and a declared terrorist incident in Golders Green in April 2026 was claimed by an Iran-linked proxy group. Analysis of three comparable conflicts - Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria - indicates the risk of domestic radicalisation, proxy attacks, and lone-actor violence will increase in the months ahead.



Introduction


The UK’s security environment has been shaped by global and domestic terror threats in recent years, demonstrated by the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing, which led to the development of Martyn’s Law, and the 2025 Manchester synagogue attack. The growth of terrorism against Western countries, including the UK, is evidenced by the fact that where terrorism has substantially decreased worldwide since 2025, it has substantially increased in Western countries (1). Threat levels in the UK have remained at ‘substantial’ or above since 2019 (2). Since March 2017, counter-terrorism police in conjunction with MI5 have disrupted at least 43 late-stage attack plots, 75% of which were part of Islamist extremism (3). This is further complicated by the fact that threat actors are mostly lone individuals radicalised and indoctrinated online (3).


Iran has been an important player in terror threats to the UK. MI5 has responded to at least twenty Iran-backed plots with potentially lethal threats to UK residents since January 2022 (3), and groups such as al-Qaeda (AQ), with which Iran holds ties, actively exploit conflict in the Middle East to call for violent action, seen in Yemen and Gaza (4). As a result, serious concerns have been raised over whether the US and Israel war with Iran and its proxies - hereafter the Iran war - launched on 28th February 2026, could escalate the risk of terrorism in the West and the UK (1).


The potential impact of hostilities with Iran on domestic terror threats has already been made clear. In the past 12 months, over 20 Iranian plots including kidnaps and attempted assassinations have been uncovered (5), compared with 10 in 2023, and the UK terror threat level was immediately put under review following the initial strikes on Iran (6). The stabbing of two Jewish men in Golders Green in April 2026, an attack declared a terrorist incident by the police, demonstrates an already-growing risk of terrorism – whilst inquiries are still underway and correlation has not been confirmed, an Iran-linked terror group known as Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI) has claimed responsibility for the attack, illustrating the threat of potential Iranian proxies in the UK (7).


Patterns during previous conflicts can help further elucidate the impact of the Iran war on upcoming domestic terror threats. This article will analyse conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, assessing similarities with conflict in Iran, to demonstrate how the Iran war may increase the threat of terrorism in the UK.

Figure 1: Approximate representation of UK threat levels throughout the 21st century (2).



Afghanistan Conflict (2001 and 2021)


The Taliban became prominent in the 1990s, gaining control of the Afghan government in 1996 (8). The US-led invasion in 2001 drove the Taliban out of power for the next two decades, however the Taliban maintained a strong influence (1). During this time, the group focused on recapturing border regions, launching large-scale incursions from Pakistan, profiting from illicit smuggling as well as building a weapons supply (1). This facilitated the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, and since then, they have served as a sanctuary for extremist groups such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) (1).


It is widely argued that the US’ 2001 invasion, motivated by a desire to reduce Taliban influence, facilitated the 2021 return to power (9), demonstrating the risk of targeting state-sponsored terrorism. Tensions between the US and Iran are similarly motivated in part by fears over state-sponsored terrorism, with the US listing Iran as a “state sponsor of terrorism” since 1984 (10). State-sponsored terrorism increases capacity by providing extremist organisations with official support, demonstrating why targeting terror-enabled governments has been a key strategy in diminishing the power of extremist groups. However, as seen in Afghanistan, this is insufficient without a commitment to stabilisation missions (11). On the contrary, it can provide an opportunity for extremist groups to find new sources of funding, allies and supporters, facilitating a return to power. Experts argue that even if the US and Israel successfully topple state-sanctioned terrorism in Iran, a resurgent Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), considered a terrorist organisation by major actors including the European Union and the US, will likely return (11). The US has not shown a desire to administer a post-conflict Iran, and the IRGC has the ability to create an organised insurgency or embed itself within the population through fragmented armed cells, increasing the likelihood of radicalisation and terrorist activity (11). Iran’s support for proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas (12) further strengthens its ability to engage in terror-motivated activity without state sponsorship, providing them with the training, weaponry and funds to conduct attacks (12). Iran-linked sleeper cells, which experts have warned may exist in Europe, could also act as proxies to conduct strikes against the West (13).


It is further important to recognise that a key component allowing the Taliban’s return to power was the border with Pakistan, which supported regrouping and the launching of large-scale attacks from 2001 to 2021 (1). Similarly, Iran’s borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan could become havens for extremist groups, allowing infiltration and attacks to intensify (11). The relationship between the Iranian government and the Taliban is growing despite religious tensions. In 2025, an Iranian delegation visited Afghanistan for high-level talks with the Taliban (8), and Iran provided support to the Taliban throughout 2001-2021 (14). Cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan and use of border regions for extremist activities, such as terror funding through arms and drug trafficking, could facilitate the strengthening of Iranian terror networks, despite attempts to disrupt them.


Ultimately, the case of Afghanistan demonstrates that targeting terror-enabled governments does not always weaken the threat of terrorism, and can increase terrorist violence by providing extremist groups with further support, discourse and the opportunity to become embedded in civil society. It may also improve cooperation with neighbouring terror networks, as state-sanctioned terror groups begin activities along borders. This is particularly the case for countries such as Iran which support terror-motivated proxies and potential sleeper cells. In the case of a destabilisation of Iranian state-sanctioned terrorism, it is likely that the months following would see an increased capacity of Iranian terror groups to operate transnationally, improving their ability to coordinate attacks within the UK.



Iraq Conflict (2003-2011)


In March 2003, the UK joined a US-led coalition in the invasion of Iraq, which overthrew Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship and divided the country between Sunni, Shia and Kurd ethnoreligious lines. The primary goal was to disarm Iraq of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which it was believed to possess (15). Likewise, the Iran war has been in part motivated by fears over Iran’s nuclear programme (16). Military involvement in Iraq was contentious, particularly when it later became apparent that Iraq had largely abandoned WMD programmes (15). Similarly, 49-50% of UK responders opposed allowing the US to launch strikes from RAF bases even if targets are restricted to missile sites, demonstrating disagreement with the UK government’s position on strikes in Iran (17). Decisions following the invasion of Iraq, such as dismantling Iraq’s military institutions and fuelling sectarian polarisation, allowed groups such as AQ and IS to exploit narratives and discourse for follower gain and grow transnationally (18). When it became apparent that Iraq’s WMD capacity was not as extensive as initially thought, beliefs spread that the war was illegitimate (18), and extremist groups were able to exploit these grievances to increase recruitment.


The exploitation of grievances was not concentrated regionally and spread to Western countries such as the UK. Former head of MI5 Baroness Manningham-Buller has stated that the war substantially increased the terror threat to the UK through youth radicalisation, saying that some British citizens saw the UK’s involvement in Iraq as being an attack on Islam (19). The killing of Ali Khamenei in February 2026 has already created, for some, a sense of martyrdom (20). Former Met officer Neil Basu has also stated that “a driver of the [7th July 2005] attacks were foreign policy and Iraq [which] radicalised and made extremists of people who might not have been radicalised or extreme” (21). The 7/7 terrorist incident saw suicide bombers attacking three underground trains and a bus in London, killing 52 people and injuring over 750. It was later revealed that the criminals involved were AQ-backed British-born terrorists (21).


Evidently, the invasion of Iraq enabled conditions for terrorist organisations to expand transnationally and exploit sentiment over the war in the UK. This is likely to have been a serious motivator behind domestic radicalisation, increasing the threat of terror-motivated violence. In the case of the Iran war, some have argued that a similar trajectory may be seen. Research groups have already argued that the UK is a flashpoint for Iranian influence efforts (22), and it is believed that British Muslim youth are particularly vulnerable to Islamist radicalisation following international events (23). This is especially the case due to increased access to the internet which hosts ample propaganda material (23). Protests in 2026 have made evident that grievances over strikes on Iran are already present (24). A London Al Quds Day march was banned to prevent “serious public disorder” in March 2026, with fears that the march organisers were “supportive of the Iranian regime” (25). The historical precedent for increased terrorist radicalisation through the exploitation of grievances in the UK after attempts to disrupt WMD programmes, often seen as illegitimate, accompanied by the already growing domestic grievances over strikes on Iran, indicate a strong likelihood that the threat of radicalisation, anti-West sentiment and terrorist violence will increase in the upcoming months.



Syrian Conflict (2011-2024)


In 2011, pro-democracy protests in Syria were met with heavy force by Bashar al-Assad’s government. Unrest escalated into all-out conflict, with then US-president Obama providing military support to groups which opposed Assad’s rule and intervening militarily to combat IS in 2014, with the help of allies such as the UK (26). The US-led coalition was especially motivated after a series of coordinated IS attacks in Europe in 2015. Whilst President Trump largely withdrew from the conflict in his first presidential term, the US maintains a presence in Syria where it continues military operations against IS and AQ affiliates (27). Regime change was a key aspect of the conflict in Syria, and when Assad was ousted in 2024, the US eased sanctions (27) and engaged in diplomatic talks (28) with new president Ahmed al-Sharaa. In the Iran war, regime change has similarly been an important factor, with the killing of Khamenei disrupting Iran’s status quo of the past several decades. Despite the implementation of a new Supreme Leader in March 2026, political instability persists due to accusations of political interference and controversy over his selection (29).


Whilst Syria has shifted away from Assad’s regime, the fragile transition, continued clashes in the northeast and rising sectarian tensions in the southwest have created a power vacuum, which IS has rapidly exploited (27). IS activity along the border has significantly increased, with attacks going up to 294 in 2024 from 121 in 2023 (11). In March 2026, it was confirmed that the fragile security architecture around the Al-Hol detention camp collapsed due to a coordinated prison break, leading to the release of over 20,000 prisoners, most of which were affiliated to IS fighters and families (11). This represents a case where the destabilisation of state structures due to regime change allowed for terrorist organisations to exploit weak security infrastructure such as detention camps, gaining supporters and expanding operations (11).


Experts have already begun demonstrating the instability prompted by the killing of Khamenei and push for regime change in Iran, which provides opportunities for groups to consolidate influence by exploiting a potential power vacuum (30). ISKP has historically attacked Iran, and may purposefully try to worsen conflict to establish a stronger territorial presence, strengthening its foreign fighter networks and proxies, and posing a direct threat to the UK. AQ has been allowed to facilitate financial transactions and the movement of fighters across Iran for the sake of disrupting Western interests, providing the organisation with a foothold in Iran (30). However, religious hostilities between the Iranian government and AQ mean that regime change could push AQ to capitalise on political instability and establish a base of operations from within the country to coordinate international terrorist attacks (30).


The case of Syria demonstrates that unstable regime change can increase the threat of terrorist violence through the creation of a power vacuum exploited by terrorist organisations. The presence of numerous groups in Iran means that organisations such as AQ and IS could exploit the ongoing political instability to establish stronger footholds and enable recruitment, facilitating terrorist activities regionally and internationally, and increasing the threat of terrorist violence in the UK.



Implications

Similarity to the Iran War Impact on Domestic Terror Threat
Afghanistan Conflict Targeting state-sponsored terrorism Increased presence in civil society and cooperation with neighbouring terror groups
Iraq Conflict Attempting to disarm WMD Increased radicalisation by exploiting war grievances
Syria Conflict Pushing for regime change Creation of a power vacuum which allows organised and lone-actor terrorism to expand

Figure 2: Similarities of the Iran war with the Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria conflicts.


Previous conflicts demonstrate that the Iran war may worsen domestic terror threats by increasing radicalisation and anti-West sentiment, pushing terrorist groups into civil societies and cooperation with neighbouring groups, and leaving a power vacuum which terrorist organisations could exploit, particularly after a lack of stabilisation mission. This has serious physical, digital and behavioural implications.


The increase in the likelihood of a terror attack creates a need for specialised protective intelligence services. This is particularly the case for high-profile individuals, organisations and events which are publicly exposed and may be specifically targeted for political or ideological reasons, such as politicians, religious leaders, celebrities and prominent corporate figures. Specific buildings and assets may also be targeted, as seen during the 2025 Manchester synagogue attack, creating a need for house surveillance and static protection operatives. Individuals of certain demographics or living in certain areas may also be targeted, as evidenced during the 2026 Golders Green stabbing. This could be made worse by organised or lone actors exposing private addresses online, providing information needed to conduct an attack against a specific person or event. Growing online radicalisation demonstrates the importance of effective digital protection, particularly in the UK, which is specifically targeted through influence networks by extremist actors. An increase in terrorism could also deteriorate the sociopolitical stability of the UK, which in turn increases the risk of violent unrest. Social and ethnic grievances, worsened in the aftermath of terrorist targeting, may prompt hostilities between different communities, exacerbating division and encouraging terror or ideologically driven activities such as political and hate-motivated violence.


Risk management consultancies and private security services support individuals’, organisations’, and events’ security and resilience in the face of growing domestic terrorism. A host of services including tailored protective intelligence gathering and threat identification practices, pre-vetted close protection teams and a 24/7 response and overwatch structure combine together in a comprehensive security management framework to enable targeted risk-based decision making, protect clients and shield reputation.



Frequently Asked Questions


What is the current UK terror threat level?

The UK’s terror threat level is currently set at ‘severe’, meaning an attack is highly likely. Threat levels have remained at ‘substantial’ or above since 2019. Following the start of the Iran war in February 2026, the threat level was placed under immediate review. Individuals and organisations should monitor MI5 guidance for the latest position.


UK THREAT LEVEL SYSTEM
CRITICAL AN ATTACK IS EXPECTED IMMINENTLY
SEVERE AN ATTACK IS HIGHLY LIKELY (Current UK National Threat Level)
SUBSTANTIAL AN ATTACK IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY
MODERATE AN ATTACK IS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT LIKELY
LOW AN ATTACK IS UNLIKELY

Figure 3: The UK’s threat level system (2).



How does the Iran war affect domestic terrorism in the UK?

Analysis of comparable conflicts indicates three mechanisms through which the Iran war may increase domestic terrorism: increased presence of extremist groups in civil society and cooperation with neighbouring terror groups; increased radicalisation by exploiting grievances; creation of a power vacuum which allows organised and lone-actor terrorism to expand.


What is state-sponsored terrorism?

State-sponsored terrorism is when a government provides support in various forms to extremist organisations, increasing their capacity and influence. Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the US since 1984, with proxies including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas.


What is the IRGC?

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a military organisation part of the Iranian Armed Forces, designated as a terrorist organisation by major actors including the European Union and the US. Experts have warned that a resurgent IRGC could reconstitute as an organised insurgency or fragmented armed cells embedded in the population, even if Iranian state-sanctioned terrorism is disrupted.


What protective measures should organisations take in the current threat environment?

Organisations should assess their threat profile and consider tailored intelligence gathering, close protection, and a 24/7 security management framework proportionate to their exposure. Peregrine Risk Management provides protective intelligence, close protection, and security risk consultancy services. Contact the team at enquiries@peregrine-rm.com or call +44 (0) 1568 607 00



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Written by:

Leane Sokhn

Peregrine Risk Management Intelligence Analyst


Large outdoor concert with bright lights and a stage, plus thousands of people in a packed crowd
By James Lawrence August 11, 2026
Large-scale events create duty of care obligations most organisations haven't stress-tested. Peregrine examines what protective intelligence looks like.
By Holly O'Sullivan July 1, 2026
FIFA President Gianni Infantino has described the upcoming 2026 FIFA World Cup as “the greatest event that humanity will ever see”, reflecting the unprecedented scale and global significance of the tournament. Jointly hosted by Mexico, the United States, and Canada, the competition will feature 48 national teams competing across 104 matches and is projected to attract approximately 6.5 million spectators while generating up to $40.9 billion in global GDP (1). Given its scale and international reach, the World Cup qualifies as a “mega-event”, defined as a large-scale spectacle of dramatic character, mass popular appeal, and international significance (2). Such events extend far beyond sport, carrying substantial political, economic, and social implications for host nations. They provide opportunities to enhance soft power, stimulate tourism, and attract investment, but also generate complex governance and security challenges due to mass mobility, infrastructure strain, and heightened international scrutiny. These challenges are particularly pronounced in Mexico, which enters the tournament amid longstanding concerns relating to organised crime, corruption, and persistent violence. Public discussion of security risks surrounding the 2026 FIFA World Cup has largely focused on cartel-related violence, particularly following the death of CJNG leader Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes (hereafter, “El Mencho”) and the subsequent wave of retaliatory attacks. While cartel violence remains an important security consideration, an exclusive focus on retaliatory cartel violence risks obscuring a wider range of threats that are likely to be more relevant to most visitors. This paper examines the security implications of hosting the 2026 FIFA World Cup in Mexico by first analysing the country’s contemporary security environment and the relationship between cartel leadership removal and retaliatory violence. It then considers the likelihood of cartel-related disruption during the tournament itself before assessing a broader spectrum of risks facing visitors, including kidnapping, extortion, corruption, and opportunistic crime. Finally, the paper argues that situational awareness and protective intelligence represent essential tools for travellers seeking to navigate Mexico’s complex security landscape and reduce their exposure to risk during the tournament. Mexico’s Security Landscape Ahead of the 2026 FIFA World Cup Mexico has long struggled with high levels of organised crime-related violence, driven primarily by competition between powerful transnational criminal organisations, fragmented cartel networks, and weak governance in certain regions. Over the past two decades, the country has experienced persistent levels of homicide, kidnapping, extortion, and armed confrontations linked to criminal groups engaged in drug trafficking and other illicit economies. This environment is further complicated by corruption and significant disparities in law enforcement effectiveness across Mexican states. Criminal organisations such as the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and the Sinaloa Cartel maintain extensive operational reach and have demonstrated the ability to conduct coordinated attacks, disrupt public order, and challenge state authority. Their activities now extend beyond drug trafficking into fuel theft, illegal mining, human trafficking, cyber-enabled crime, and systematic extortion (3). Security concerns surrounding Mexico’s role in the 2026 World Cup escalated following a significant increase in cartel-related violence in February 2026. During this period, Mexican security forces, in coordination with US intelligence, killed El Mencho, leader of the CJNG. In the immediate aftermath, Guadalajara descended into widespread disorder, with violence spreading across multiple states as CJNG members launched retaliatory attacks. Businesses, banks, and pharmacies were set ablaze, while armed cartel members established burning roadblocks, known as narcobloqueos, using hijacked vehicles. Reports of unrest emerged across major urban centres and tourist destinations, including Puerto Vallarta. Although some claims of airport gunfire were later denied, the disruption led to flight cancellations and the temporary displacement of tourists. Authorities advised residents and visitors to remain indoors as the situation deteriorated. A Recurring Pattern of Cartel Retaliation The events that followed the death of “El Mencho” at the hands of Mexican security forces were neither unique nor unprecedented. Rather, they conformed to a pattern Mexico knows all too well: the killing or capture of a prominent cartel leader is often followed by intense retaliatory violence (4). A notable example occurred in 2023 following the recapture of Ovidio Guzmán-López, the alleged leader of a faction of the Sinaloa Cartel founded by his father. The operation triggered widespread unrest across the state of Sinaloa. Two aircraft at Sinaloan airports were struck by gunfire, leading to the cancellation of more than 100 flights and the temporary closure of Culiacán International Airport. Likewise, two Mexican Air Force aircraft were forced to make emergency landings after sustaining gunfire damage. Cartel members erected roadblocks, or narcobloqueos, and set dozens of vehicles ablaze in Culiacán, Los Mochis, and Guasave. The unrest also involved looting, armed confrontations, and widespread disruption to daily life. Similar scenes unfolded in 2019 during Guzmán-López’s first arrest. On that occasion, the violence escalated to such an extent that Mexican authorities ultimately released him. Approximately 600 heavily armed cartel gunmen threatened mass civilian casualties and launched coordinated attacks throughout Culiacán, including assaults on an apartment complex housing relatives of local military personnel. The scale of the violence demonstrated the cartels’ capacity to exert pressure on the state through the threat of indiscriminate retaliation. Such patterns are deeply embedded in Mexico’s security environment. A further example can be seen in the aftermath of the 2009 killing of Arturo Beltrán Leyva, which was followed by retaliatory attacks, including violence directed at security forces and their families. These cases illustrate that retaliation is not incidental but forms a consistent feature of cartel-state interactions. These examples illustrate a specific form of cartel violence: retaliatory violence. Such incidents are typically directed against the state, security forces, rival criminal organisations, or strategic infrastructure and often occur following actions perceived as threatening cartel interests. While these events generate significant media attention due to their scale and visibility, they should not be conflated with other forms of criminal activity conducted by cartels. Understanding this distinction is essential when assessing the risks likely to face visitors during the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Why Cartels Retaliate After Leadership Removal Before examining why cartels engage in retaliatory violence following leadership removal, it is necessary to understand the role violence plays within criminal organisations more broadly. Violence is a defining characteristic of organised crime, with scholars describing such groups as “violent entrepreneurs” (5). Indeed, it constitutes a core mechanism through which cartels operate and pursue their objectives. One explanation for this lies in market competition (6). Cartels compete over territory, resources, and access to illicit markets, and violence serves to assert control over these assets while deterring rival encroachment. Using violence, cartels signal both their capacity and willingness to defend their interests. A second explanation relates to the illegal environment in which these organisations operate. Because participants in illicit markets cannot rely on state institutions for protection or to dispute resolution, they must develop alternative mechanisms for safeguarding their interests. As a result, violence often functions as a substitute for formal legal institutions, enabling cartels to enforce agreements, punish non-compliance, and maintain order. While cartels may employ violence in different ways, what remains constant is that it is a necessary and recurring feature of their survival. Given this, threats to organisational survival are likely to provoke violent responses. Understanding violence as an integral component of cartel operations therefore helps explain why leadership removal may be followed by retaliation. One key explanation for violence following the death, arrest, or capture of cartel leaders is organisational fragmentation (7). The removal of a prominent leader disrupts power structures and creates new internal dynamics. Potential successors may seek to consolidate authority through displays of strength, often through violence against rivals or dissenting factions. In some cases, leadership removal can trigger splintering, leading to increased intergroup competition and violence. This has been particularly evident in Mexico, where some analysts argue that the government’s “kingpin strategy”, targeting senior cartel figures, has contributed to rising violence (8). For example, following the detention of figures such as “El Chapo” and “El Mayo”, the Sinaloa Cartel fragmented into rival factions: Los Chapitos and Los Mayos. Even where organisations do not fully splinter, internal succession disputes can still generate significant violence. In addition, fragmentation can create opportunities for rival cartels to exploit weakened command structures, challenge territory and expand their influence, further intensifying instability (9). Estimating Cartel-Related Violence During the 2026 FIFA World Cup Given Mexico’s historical experience, major government or security force operations against cartel leadership have often been followed by retaliatory violence. This pattern suggests that Mexican authorities may be hesitant to undertake large-scale operations against cartels or high-profile members in the lead-up to, or during, the World Cup, a caution likely reinforced by the significant operational demands associated with hosting a mega-event. Following the most recent escalation in cartel violence in February 2026, Mexican authorities introduced Plan Kukulkan, a comprehensive security framework designed to ensure public and visitor safety throughout the tournament. Roman Villalvazo, head of Mexico’s World Cup coordination centre, announced that “just over 99,000 personnel” would be deployed under the plan. This includes approximately 20,000 military personnel and 55,000 police officers, alongside private security forces, supported by 2,500 military and civilian vehicles, 24 aircraft, anti-drone systems, and specialist detection dogs trained to identify explosives and substances. The operation also extends beyond stadium venues to encompass key tourist destinations across host cities including Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey. However, despite the scale of this security provision, it is likely to place considerable strain on Mexico’s operational and institutional capacity. Securing multiple high-profile venues at once, alongside managing large volumes of movement, may limit the ability to carry out additional counter-cartel operations. As a result, although the security presence will be extensive, large-scale actions against cartel leadership are less likely during the tournament period, reducing the likelihood, but not eliminating the risk of retaliatory violence. More importantly, past experience demonstrates that aggressive counter-cartel actions can provoke violent reprisals, creating security risks that authorities will seek to avoid during a period of heightened international attention. However, this does not imply that travellers will not face risks. Highlighting Key Risks in Mexico This article in no way seeks to downplay the risk posed by cartel-related violence. In fact, such violence remains a significant concern, particularly given the succession crisis and instability likely to emerge within the CJNG following recent leadership removal (11). Rather, this paper seeks to draw attention to a range of security risks that have received comparatively less attention amid the focus on recent retaliatory cartel violence. Kidnapping Kidnapping remains a significant security concern in Mexico. At the time of writing, the issue has received heightened public attention following the widely publicised kidnapping of journalist Roxana Berenice Guzmán in the state of Veracruz, footage of which has circulated extensively online. According to Alto al Secuestro, Mexico recorded 2,844 kidnappings between October 2024 and April 2026, equating to an average of approximately 4.9 incidents per day. However, the prevalence of kidnapping varies considerably between states and regions. The nature of kidnapping threats also differs depending on the intended victim. While residents may be targeted for financial, criminal, or personal motives, foreign travellers often face distinct risks. One notable tactic involves criminals using dating applications to lure victims to predetermined locations where they are subsequently abducted and extorted. Such incidents prompted the U.S. State Department to issue a security alert following multiple kidnappings of American citizens in the Guadalajara, Puerto Vallarta, and Nuevo Nayarit areas in June 2025. The influx of international visitors during the 2026 FIFA World Cup may create additional opportunities for criminal groups to target foreign nationals. Travellers unfamiliar with local security risks, transportation networks, or high-risk areas may be particularly vulnerable to opportunistic kidnappings, express kidnappings, and extortion schemes. Criminals may exploit situations where visitors are travelling alone, arranging informal transport, or displaying signs of wealth. The heightened concentration of foreign visitors is likely to increase the attractiveness of these targets for organised criminal actors operating in host cities and surrounding regions. Extortion and Corruption Extortion represents one of Mexico's most pervasive criminal threats and is often referred to as the country's "silent crime." During the first four months of 2026 alone, authorities recorded approximately 3,600 extortion cases nationwide (12). However, the true scale of the problem is likely substantially higher. Estimates suggest that only around 0.2% of extortion incidents are formally reported, largely due to victims' fears of retaliation from criminal groups. This widespread underreporting contributes to extortion's reputation as a crime that frequently remains hidden from official statistics. According to the Global Organized Crime Index, Mexico ranks among the five countries most severely affected by extortion worldwide (13). Extortion affects all levels of society, from large business owners to small shopkeepers, many of whom are coerced into making regular payments to organised criminal groups. The practice takes various forms, including direct extortion, indirect extortion, and virtual extortion schemes conducted via telephone or online platforms. Criminal organisations frequently leverage threats of violence and property damage to compel compliance from victims. Closely related to this issue is corruption, particularly in the form of petty bribery. In Mexico, the term la mordida ("the bite") is commonly used to describe informal payments or bribes, most often involving public officials (14). Travellers may encounter situations in which local officials, particularly during traffic stops, allegedly fabricate or exaggerate minor infractions to solicit cash payments. Although such incidents do not occur universally, they remain a widely reported concern and contribute to broader perceptions of corruption within certain institutions. Opportunistic Crime While public attention is often focused on high-impact crimes such as homicide, kidnapping, and extortion, opportunistic crime frequently poses a greater day-to-day risk to travellers. Although generally less severe in its consequences, crimes such as pickpocketing, theft, scams, and robbery occur far more frequently and are therefore more likely to affect visitors. Opportunistic crime is prevalent throughout Mexico, particularly within densely populated urban centres, tourist destinations, and transportation hubs. Criminals frequently exploit crowded environments, distractions, and lapses in situational awareness to target victims. Public transportation networks, major tourist attractions, markets, and entertainment districts provide ideal conditions for thieves to operate discreetly among large crowds. The risk of opportunistic crime may increase during mega-events such as the FIFA World Cup, when substantial numbers of domestic and international visitors converge on host cities. Increased footfall crowded public spaces, and visitors' unfamiliarity with local environments can create additional opportunities for criminal activity. Consequently, maintaining situational awareness, safeguarding personal belongings, and exercising caution in crowded areas remain important preventative measures for travellers. The Need for Situational Awareness and Protective Intelligence The principal security challenge facing visitors during the 2026 FIFA World Cup is unlikely to be retaliatory cartel violence alone. While the prospect of shootouts, narcobloqueos, and large-scale cartel-state confrontations often dominates public discourse, most travellers are more likely to encounter lower-level but more prevalent threats, including theft, scams, extortion, corruption, and, in some circumstances, kidnapping. Many of these threats may still be linked to organised criminal networks, but they differ significantly from the forms of violence typically associated with cartel warfare. As such, safe travel requires more than reliance on state security measures. It requires an understanding of situational awareness and protective intelligence. Situational awareness refers to an individual's ability to understand their environment, recognise potential risks, and anticipate how circumstances may develop. In practice, this involves more than simply being alert to one's surroundings. It requires the continuous assessment of information, understanding how different factors interact, and using that understanding to make informed decisions. For visitors to Mexico, situational awareness may involve recognising when an area feels unsafe, identifying suspicious behaviour, understanding local security dynamics, or adapting travel plans in response to emerging incidents. This is particularly important during a mega-event such as the World Cup. Millions of visitors will move through airports, public transport systems, fan zones, stadiums, and tourist districts, creating crowded and often unfamiliar environments. Such conditions can present opportunities for criminal actors, whether organised groups conducting targeted criminality or opportunistic offenders seeking easy victims. The ability to recognise risks before they escalate can significantly reduce an individual's vulnerability. Closely linked to situational awareness is protective intelligence. Whereas situational awareness focuses on understanding the immediate environment, protective intelligence is concerned with gathering and analysing information to identify potential threats before they materialise. Rather than reacting to incidents, protective intelligence seeks to anticipate them. This may involve monitoring security developments, assessing emerging risks, analysing criminal trends, or identifying indicators that suggest conditions are deteriorating. For travellers attending the World Cup, protective intelligence can provide a clearer picture of the operating environment. Pre-travel risk assessments, local threat reporting, transport disruption alerts, and real-time security updates can all help visitors make more informed decisions regarding accommodation, movement, and personal security. Importantly, protective intelligence does not eliminate risk; rather, it reduces uncertainty by providing timely and actionable information. Specialist security providers can play an important role in this process, leveraging open-source intelligence (OSINT), security monitoring, and intelligence analysis to support travellers operating in unfamiliar or complex environments. Services such as destination-specific risk assessments, real-time travel alerts and OSINT can help individuals remain informed and adapt to changing circumstances. During a tournament expected to attract millions of visitors across multiple Mexican cities, access to accurate and timely information may prove just as valuable as visible security measures on the ground. Ultimately, the success of Mexico's World Cup security effort will not depend solely on the number of police officers or security personnel deployed. Security is also shaped by the decisions individuals make prior and during their travels. Situational awareness and protective intelligence provide a framework through which visitors can better understand their environment, identify potential threats, and reduce their exposure to risk. In a country with a complex and evolving security landscape, these capabilities may be among the most effective tools available to travellers. Conclusion While cartel-related violence remains a defining feature of Mexico’s security environment, focusing solely on retaliatory violence presents an incomplete picture of the risks facing visitors during the 2026 FIFA World Cup. A distinction must be made between retaliatory cartel violence and cartel-linked criminality. The former encompasses highly visible incidents such as shootouts, attacks on security forces, and narcobloqueos that frequently dominate international headlines. The latter includes criminal activities such as kidnapping, extortion, coercion, and other forms of predatory criminality that may be conducted by the same organisations but present a different and often more direct threat to visitors. Although the probability of tourists becoming caught in large-scale retaliatory violence may remain relatively low, exposure to cartel-linked criminality and opportunistic crime is considerably more plausible. The scale and complexity of the tournament will place significant pressure on Mexico’s security infrastructure. Despite extensive state planning under frameworks such as Plan Kukulkan, the realities of managing an influx of international visitors across multiple cities mean that risk cannot be fully mitigated through policing and military deployment alone. Security at mega-events is therefore not only a matter of state capacity, but also of individual behaviour and decision-making within the environment. In this context, situational awareness and protective intelligence offer a practical and necessary addition to formal security provisions. Situational awareness enables travellers to interpret their surroundings and respond dynamically to changing conditions, while protective intelligence provides the anticipatory layer of analysis needed to understand risks before they materialise. Together, they reduce uncertainty and improve decision-making in complex and fast-moving environments. Ultimately, the effectiveness of security during the World Cup will depend on a combination of institutional measures and individual preparedness. For visitors, the ability to understand risk, interpret context, and act on timely information may be just as important as the visible security presence on the ground. In a country with a layered and evolving threat landscape, these capabilities are not supplementary; they are essential to safe and informed travel. References 1. FIFA. FIFA-WTO study estimates USD 47 billion economic output from FIFA Club World CupTM and FIFA World CupTM in the US. 2025. Available from: https://inside.fifa.com/organisation/media-releases/fifa-wto-study-estimates-usd-47-billion-economic-output-from-fifa-club-world 2. Rookwood J, Oates TP. Coordinating security, managing crowds, and marketing social control: examining key organizational challenges facing the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup in Canada, Mexico, and USA. Soccer & Society. 2026 Mar 10. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970.2026.2640519 3. Mexico. ACLED. 2023. Available from: https://acleddata.com/country/mexico 4. Gambetta D. The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press; 1996. 5. Jordan J. When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation. Security Studies. 2009 Dec 2;18(4):719-55. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903369068 6. Grillo I. El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency. Bloomsbury Publishing USA; 2011. 7. Jordan J. Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark. International Security. 2014 Apr;38(4):7-38. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24481099 8. Rios V. Why did Mexico become so violent? A self-reinforcing violent equilibrium caused by competition and enforcement. Trends in Organized Crime. 2012 Aug 9;16(2):138-55. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-012-9175-z 9. Kroc J. Drug Violence in Mexico Trans-Border Institute Special Report by Viridiana Ríos and David A. Shirk Special Report by Viridiana Ríos and David A. Shirk. 2011. Available from: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/2011_DVM.pdf 10. Schedler A. The Criminal Subversion of Mexican Democracy. Journal of Democracy. 2014;25(1):5-18. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2014.0016 11. Graham T. After “El Mencho”, Mexico braces for cartel succession battle. The Observer. 2026. Available from: https://observer.co.uk/news/international/article/after-el-mencho-mexico-braces-for-the-coming-cartel-succession-battle 12. Breña CM. Extortion: Mexico’s new battle against a deeply rooted crime [Internet]. EL PAÍS English. 2025. Available from: https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-07-08/extortion-mexicos-new-battle-against-a-deeply-rooted-crime.html 13. Global Organized Crime Index. Criminality in Mexico - The Organized Crime Index. 2023. Available from: https://ocindex.net/country/mexico 14. Miller K. Managing la mordida: Gringo Tourism, Police Shakedowns, and the Nature of Traffic Ticket Bribery in Quintana Roo, Mexico. Deviant Behaviour. 2023 Jan 8. 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/01639625.2023.2165198
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